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Research documents that linguistic tone is incrementally informative about stock returns. What remains a 
puzzle is the mechanism by which investors can assess its credibility. We examine whether 
contemporaneous information in management earnings forecasts serves as a timely alternative to ex post 
verification. We document that ex post verifiable quantitative news in unbundled forecasts, and 
characteristics of the linguistic tone itself, affect investors’ pricing of tone. Consistent with higher quality 
signals enhancing the credibility of contemporaneous lower quality signals, we find that quantitative news 
verifies the associated linguistic tone; when the two signals have the same sign, the price effect of tone is 
stronger. Furthermore, the pricing attenuation of tone is increasing in the imprecision of the quantitative 
forecast, suggesting that lower forecast quality compromises the quantitative signal’s credibility 
enhancement. Managerial incentives to inflate tone lead to the verification effect being greater for 
optimistic language, while management’s use of hyperbole results in attenuation of the tone’s pricing.  
 
JEL Classifications: G14; D82; M41 
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A growing body of literature seeks to understand the properties and price relevance of language (often 
referred to “linguistic sentiment” or “linguistic tone”) in corporate disclosures, incremental to 
simultaneously released quantitative news. The null hypothesis in these studies, that language is not 
incrementally priced, is hardly a straw man, given that language shares several of the key characteristics 
of cheap talk; notably, it is costless to convey and relatively difficult to verify, even ex post. However, in 
spite of its propensity to be cheap talk, studies continue to document that language is priced in several 
situations: earnings announcements (Davis et al. 2012; Demers and Vega 2014), restatement 
announcements (Mangen and Durnev 2010), IPO prospectuses (Balakrishnan and Bartov 2010), 
conference calls (Chen et al. 2014), and MD&A and other elements of the 10K reports (Davis and Tama-
Sweet 2012; Feldman et al. 2010; Li 2010).  
Although prior research documents language’s incremental pricing, it does not identify a 
mechanism that serves as a timely alternative to ex post verification by which investors can assess the 
likely credibility of language. Our objective is to begin to fill this gap in the literature by investigating 
whether information in the disclosure itself provides a contemporaneous verification of the credibility of 
language and thus strengthens its market pricing. To accomplish this, we examine the pricing of linguistic 
tone in management forecast disclosures that are not bundled with earnings releases. These disclosures 
possess certain properties that provide a relatively well-controlled environment in which to test our 
contemporaneous verification conjecture. In unbundled management forecast disclosures, two primary 
signals are present: the quantitative (i.e., hard) management forecast news and linguistic tone.1 One of the 
two signals, the quantitative management forecast, is verified by the subsequent earnings realization.  
Stocken (2000) examines the credibility of a manager’s disclosure of information in a repeated cheap talk 
                                                 
1 Management forecasts bundled with earnings releases (e.g., Rogers and VanBuskirk 2012) may confound the 
analysis with a third signal, the earnings realization. Earnings releases also contain a substantial amount of new 
disclosures that can affect stock prices and that make it difficult to link linguistic tone to a given hard signal, adding 
noise to the analysis. For these reasons, we discard management forecasts bundled with earnings releases to perform 




game and concludes that the manager almost always truthfully reveals private information under certain 
sufficiency conditions, including an accounting report that can be used to assess credibility ex post. Thus, 
because it is verifiable, the quantitative management forecast is expected to be a higher quality signal than 
the accompanying linguistic tone. However, because managers choose the precision of their quantitative 
forecasts, the quality of quantitative forecasts varies in the cross-section. 
We investigate three factors that affect investors’ pricing of linguistic tone: 1) the correspondence 
between contemporaneously observable, ex post verifiable quantitative management forecast news and 
the ex post less verifiable linguistic tone; 2) the precision of the quantitative management forecast; and 3) 
a characteristic of the linguistic tone, the use of hyperbole. First, we predict that quantitative management 
forecasts serve as contemporaneous verifiers of accompanying linguistic tone; when the two signals are 
consistent (i.e., the signs of the quantitative management forecast and linguistic tone agree), linguistic 
tone is priced more. Past empirical results in other settings, as well as economic models, suggest that, in 
the presence of two signals, the higher quality signal can add credence to the potentially lower quality 
signal. For example, Jennings (1987) documents that contemporaneous financial analyst revisions serve to 
verify the veracity of management forecasts. Baginski and Hassell (1990) document that analyst forecast 
revisions are greater when the market reaction to a management forecast agrees with the management 
forecast news. Hutton et al. (2003) document that a potentially less credible good news management 
earnings forecast is perceived as more credible when it is issued with more verifiable information. 
Dambra et al. (2013) document that less verifiable non-GAAP forecasts are viewed by investors as more 
credible if they are accompanied by a verifiable management earnings forecast. The notion that a 
verifiable, co-existing public signal affects the precision and information of a second signal based on a 
sender’s private information is also consistent with the cheap talk model proposed by Fischer and Stocken 
(2010). Second, we predict that the verification effect is stronger when a good news quantitative forecast 
confirms positive linguistic tone, consistent with the notion that good news is inherently less credible than 




management incentives to increase stock prices. Third, we predict that the ability of the quantitative 
management forecast to contemporaneously corroborate linguistic tone is compromised by lower 
quantitative forecast quality (e.g., imprecise forecast forms and rounding as identified by Baginski et al. 
1993; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Bamber et al. 2010), and thus linguistic tone pricing is attenuated when 
management forecasts are imprecise. Fourth, we predict that linguistic tone pricing is attenuated by a 
characteristic of the tone itself, management’s use of extreme language (i.e., hyperbole) (Admati and 
Pfliederer 2004).  
Using a Factiva search, we identify a sample of 1,754 management earnings forecasts from 1997 
through 2006 from which we derive a measure of linguistic tone. After empirically confirming two results 
from prior language research in our unique forecast setting—that is, that linguistic tone is incrementally 
priced and that tone is generally consistent with the accompanying hard news—we find results that 
support our four predictions. Our findings are not confounded by the presence of external attributions 
(Baginski et al. 2004), other disclosure content including special items that accompany forecasts, or 
limiting our sample to unbundled forecasts. Furthermore, we find no evidence of short-run reversal of the 
verification effect in post-announcement drift tests. 
Our study extends the linguistic tone literature in several ways. First, we establish that 
quantitative management forecasts serve as contemporaneous verifiers of linguistic tone (more so for 
optimistic tone, consistent with management incentives to inflate prices), and we thereby provide 
evidence of a mechanism by which investors contemporaneously assess the veracity of tone information 
that is otherwise difficult to verify, even ex post. Second, we document that hyperbole serves as a 
contemporaneous modifier of linguistic tone, consistent with the predictions of theoretical cheap talk 
models. Although not the primary motivation for our study, we also confirm that the economically 
meaningful pricing effect associated with linguistic tone that accompanies other types of quantitative 
disclosures (e.g., earnings realizations, quantitative explanations of performance in the MD&A, 




forecast announcements. In addition to being confirmatory, our evidence offers a unique contribution to 
this prior set of studies. On the one hand, one might expect that the imprecise language signal would have 
greater information content in the management forecast situation vis-à-vis the earnings release setting 
because it does not have to compete with the substantial amount of information in the earnings release 
setting, much of which is subject to auditor scrutiny. On the other hand, the unbundled management 
forecast is primarily an incentives-driven disclosure event. Given that many of these incentives may lead 
to lower quality disclosures of both expected earnings and language, there is substantial tension about 
whether language is credible in the management forecast setting and whether the management earnings 
forecast (itself incentives-driven) can verify language. Furthermore, because the primary underlying 
economic reason to expect linguistic tone to be informative for prices is its predictive power for earnings, 
it is most surprising to find that language remains statistically and economically significant when it 
accompanies management-issued earnings forecasts.   
Our findings also extend the understanding of the pricing consequences of management forecasts.  
Prior management forecast research documents the effects of supplemental disclosures on the pricing of 
quantitative forecast news (Hutton et al. 2003; Baginski et al. 2004). We complement this finding by 
documenting the reverse effect of quantitative management forecast news on the pricing of supplemental 
linguistic tone. We also show that hard management forecast precision, as measured by forecast form and 
rounding, has implications beyond its effects on the pricing of the hard forecast news itself; forecast 
precision also is associated with the market pricing of accompanying language. 
In the sections that follow, we develop our three hypotheses, describe data and the research 
design, and then present results and supplemental empirical tests. 
2 Hypothesis development 




The price-relevance of language is plausible if language is a sufficiently reliable signal of future earnings 
or dividends. However, language is relatively costless to provide, difficult to verify, and likely linked to 
future earnings and dividends in a fairly noisy way. The difficulty of ex post verification, in particular, 
calls the informativeness of cheap talk into question (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Benabou and Laroque 
1992; Dye and Sridhar 2004). However, prior empirical work shows that, on average, linguistic tone is 
incrementally informative for security prices when released with an earnings announcement (Davis et al. 
2012; Demers and Vega 2014) and in other communications (e.g., IPO prospectuses, restatement 
announcements, and conference calls). These studies also document an association between linguistic 
tone and future earnings and between tone and the uncertainty of future earnings, thus establishing 
plausible links to valuation fundamentals as the reason for the information content of language. The 
information content of linguistic tone is also suggested by a general aversion to lying (Gneezy 2005; 
Hurkins and Kartik 2009). Furthermore, models in behavioral economics (e.g., Mullainathan et al. 2008) 
and experimental results (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2010) suggest that uninformative material can affect choice, 
while archival evidence also supports the conclusion that apparently uninformative disclosures can matter 
(Michels 2012).   
The language that we investigate accompanies management earnings forecasts. A manager 
provides two potentially price-relevant signals, one a quantitative forecast of earnings, the other a set of 
words from which linguistic tone can be ascertained. On average, we expect the quantitative management 
forecasts to be credible. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) provide evidence that managers use forecasts to adjust 
market expectations by revealing their private information, and King et al. (1990) provide the economic 
underpinnings of the expectations-adjustment hypothesis. Stocken (2000) examines the credibility of a 
manager’s disclosure of information in a repeated cheap talk game and concludes that the manager almost 
always truthfully reveals private information under certain sufficiency conditions, including an 
accounting report that can be used to assess credibility ex post (i.e., as is the case for the quantitative 




In summary, the verifiability of quantitative management forecasts enhances their credibility, and 
thus they can serve as contemporaneous verifiers of the accompanying linguistic tone. If the intent of a 
management forecast press release is to adjust market expectations through the credible revelation of 
private information, then it is less likely that the manager would issue conflicting linguistic tone and 
quantitative forecast news. Indeed, the general agreement of linguistic tone and hard earnings news in the 
earnings press release setting is verified empirically by Demers and Vega (2014), and we document that it 
is commonly the case in our forecast setting as well.  
We expect the price relevance of linguistic tone to be strengthened by the agreement of the 
quantitative management forecast with the linguistic tone. Our view is consistent with that of Jennings 
(1987), who documents that contemporaneous financial analyst revisions verify the veracity of 
management forecasts; with that of Baginski and Hassell (1990), who document that analyst forecast 
revisions are greater when the market reaction agrees with management forecast news; with that of 
Hutton et al. (2003), who argue that less believable news is more credible when issued with more 
verifiable information; and with that of Dambra et al. (2013), who document that less verifiable non-
GAAP forecasts are viewed by investors as more credible when accompanied by a verifiable management 
earnings forecast. The notion that a credible, co-existing public signal affects the precision and 
informativeness of a second signal based upon the sender’s private information is also consistent with the 
cheap talk model proposed by Fischer and Stocken (2010). They find that, when information costs are 
moderate, more precise public information leads an incentives-driven information sender to gather more 
precise private information to increase the decision-maker’s use of the disclosure and facilitate credible 
communication. Stated in the alternative form, our first hypothesis (the “agreement” hypothesis) is 
therefore as follows: 
H1a The price response to linguistic tone accompanying a quantitative management forecast is 




whether their signs agree (i.e., linguistic tone is optimistic and management forecast news is good or it is 
pessimistic and management forecast news is bad). 
The fact that management forecasts are also incentives-driven adds tension to this hypothesis. 
That is, the hypothesis is predicated on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. We predict that 
the more precise signal (the management earnings forecast) verifies the less precise one (language). We 
have no basis for hypothesizing the reverse. 
2.2 The management incentives hypothesis 
Management incentives play a role in the strength of our H1a prediction. We expect the effect of sign 
agreement predicted in H1a to be greater when the quantitative management forecast news sign is positive 
and confirms an optimistic tone (relative to when negative forecast news confirms a negative tone). This 
additional conjecture is supported by cheap talk theories, which suggest that language inflation (i.e., 
overly optimistic language) occurs and that this phenomenon exists regardless of the costs of lying 
(Kartik 2009). Although a rational receiver of information is not deceived and thus discounts the 
language, the sender nevertheless does not remove the inflation because the sender fully expects the 
receiver to apply discounting.  Blanes i Vidal (2003) modifies the model proposed by Morgan and 
Stocken (2003) to establish an equilibrium in which investors react more to bad news than to good news 
in the presence of cheap talk. The receiver’s presumption that language is inflated is driven by the 
relatively few management incentives to release bad news and numerous incentives to increase share 
prices.2 If management incentives lead to language inflation and inflation attenuates price response to net 
                                                 
2 This asymmetry does not necessarily arise from managers’ opportunism. Many of the managers’ personal 
incentives are aligned with the firm’s incentives via share ownership, compensation based on firm performance, and 
the shared benefits of a good reputation. Even in the relatively few cases where the manager’s motive for voluntary 
disclosure is opportunistic, only a handful of situations suggest purely self-serving incentives to downward bias 
disclosure news.  For example, bad news might be strategically timed before the date of determining the share price 
for an option grant (Aboody and Kasznik 2000), before a management takeover attempt (Hafzalla 2009), and before 
insider buying. This is not to say that these events do not occur or are not economically meaningful to the parties 
involved, just that one would expect that, in the broad cross-section, they are not sufficiently pervasive to suggest an 




positive tone, we predict that the contemporaneous verification effect is potentially strongest for net 
positive relative to net negative tone: 
H1b The effect of sign agreement is greater for optimistic (relative to pessimistic) linguistic tone. 
This effect is driven by the expected optimistic bias of the linguistic tone not of the management forecast. 
The theory underlying the H1b prediction treats language, being largely unverifiable, as cheap talk.  
Theory predicts a discounting of good-news cheap talk relative to bad-news cheap talk when incentives 
for good-news disclosure exist. Significant tension is introduced if good-news management forecasts (i.e., 
the verifying signals) are less credible than bad-news management forecasts. However, we expect good-
news management forecasts to be equally credible verifiers of language because management forecasts 
possess a characteristic, ex post verifiability, that is not a characteristic of cheap talk (Stocken 2000).3  
2.3 The hard news precision hypothesis 
Although more ex post verifiable than language, the ability of a quantitative management forecast to serve 
as a contemporaneous verifier varies in the cross-section because management forecasts are often 
imprecise and thus of lower quality. Management forecasts are often expressed in ranges, in minimums or 
maximums, or rounded to the nearest nickel (Baginski and Hassell 1997; Bamber and Cheon 1998; 
Bamber et al. 2010). If management forecast imprecision hinders the forecast’s verification role, it 
decreases the price impact of accompanying linguistic tone (the hard-news precision hypothesis): 
H2 The price response to linguistic tone accompanying a quantitative management forecast is 
decreasing in the imprecision of the management forecast as measured by the width of the forecast range 
and whether the forecast is rounded. 
                                                 
3 Consistent with the role of ex post verifiability as a disciplining mechanism for management earnings forecasts, 
Rogers and Stocken (2005) and Kothari et al. (2009) find that good-news management forecasts are not less accurate 
than bad-news management forecasts. Merkeley et al. (2013) also suggest that good-news management forecasts are 




2.4 The hyperbole hypothesis 
Finally, we consider a contemporaneously available characteristic of the language itself. Hyperbole is the 
use of language in the extreme to provide emphasis, even though the expressions are not to be taken 
literally. In addition to the frequent use of hyperbole in creative writing, hyperbole manifests in evaluative 
contexts such as online reviews of movies, products, and physicians. For example, Anderson (1998) 
argues that the consumer’s marginal utility from word of mouth rating of a product increases with the 
amount of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction, yielding the expectation and empirical finding of a U-
shaped customer satisfaction distribution. Using a cheap talk model, Admati and Pfliederer (2004) 
demonstrate that, if the underlying distribution is uniform, sender overconfidence always leads to a 
decrease in the amount of information transmitted in equilibrium because of the sender’s tendency to 
exaggerate. More extreme messages characterize the equilibrium.  
 To the extent that hyperbole bias exists, either due to its marginal utility or as a consequence of 
overconfidence, we expect extreme net positive and net negative tone to be discounted by investors (the 
hyperbole hypothesis): 
H3 The price response to linguistic tone accompanying a quantitative management forecast is 
decreasing in the absolute magnitude of linguistic tone. 
 In summary, our hypotheses are based solely on observable contemporaneous characteristics in 
the management earnings forecast disclosure: the sign of the quantitative forecast news, the width of the 
quantitative forecast range, whether the forecast is rounded, and the sign and absolute magnitude of the 
linguistic tone measure. In tests described later, we control for a host of variables capturing other potential 
cross-sectional determinants of the price reaction to linguistic tone.   
3 Sample and language data 




We use the Factiva database to individually identify and download candidate management earnings 
forecasts. We follow Baginski et al. (2004) by using business newswires Dow Jones Business News 
(“DJBN”) and Press Release Newswire (“PRN”) to search for the following word strings—“expects 
earnings,” “expects net,” “expects income,” “expects losses,” “expects profits,” and “expects results”—in 
addition to three parallel lists where “expects” is replaced alternatively by “forecasts,” “predicts,” and 
“sees”. As reported in Table 1, this search yielded 6,180 candidate earnings forecasts (3,577 for DJBN 
and 2,603 for PRN) for the period of 1997 through 2006. We next created individual .txt files for each 
candidate management forecast article and extracted firm identifiers for the companies underlying each 
respective Factiva article to match the candidate observations into the CRSP, Compustat, and First Call 
databases.4 To be included in our initial sample, each candidate management forecast from Factiva had to 
match up with a management forecast from the First Call Company Issued Guidance database within a 
three-day window surrounding the Factiva date.5 We delete 2,136 observations with fewer than 100 
                                                 
4 Where available, the ticker symbol associated with the firm covered in the newswire article was extracted 
electronically from the text of the Factiva download using the Factiva ticker symbol tag. In many instances, 
particularly for the PR Newswire articles later in the sample period, there were no tagged ticker symbols included in 
the Factiva output. Accordingly, we developed an algorithm that used the unique Factiva codes to generate smart 
guesses at the firm’s ticker symbol. Factiva has assigned unique ticker-symbol-like codes to each firm in its 
database. These codes are often similar, if not identical, to the firm’s ticker symbol. Accordingly, we first tried to 
match the Factiva code as closely as possible to a ticker symbol in the CRSP master list using Stata. We then 
verified the accuracy of these guesses by using a second automated algorithm to compare a string from the Factiva 
tagged company name to a string from the company name in the CRSP master list. All of these automated 
“candidate matches” were then manually verified. Most of the incorrect matches related to companies whose names 
contained initials or that were characterized as having a generic first name in their corporate name (e.g., “General” 
or “National”). In over 800 cases, a Factiva code, ticker symbol, or company name was not extractable using 
standard programming techniques. For these unmatched Factiva observations, as well as for those that were found to 
have been erroneously matched due to initialed or generic corporate names, we manually matched the Factiva 
article’s company details into the CRSP master list. A review of the observations we failed to match suggests that 
many of them relate to foreign companies, venture capital organizations, pre-IPO entities, or other firms that are 
appropriately excluded from our sample, or that the Factiva articles were generated by market analysts discussing a 
sector or firm’s prospects rather than being management forecasts. 
5 The requirement that our press release observations match with First Call earnings forecasts results in the loss of 
some press releases. Chuk et al. (2013) document that excluded observations are likely to be made by firms that a) 
have less analyst forecast coverage, b) have poor prior performance, c) do not issue an accompanying earnings 
release, and d) do not provide an EPS forecast (e.g., provide a revenue or cash flow forecast instead). Because we 
require analyst forecasts for our observations, have other data requirements that skew our sample toward larger 
firms, focus on earnings forecasts, and sample primarily after 1997 (which is suggested by Chuk et al. (2013) as a 
means of mitigating bias), we do not believe that our sample would be meaningfully different had First Call matches 
not been required. However, the data required by our research design does result in a larger firm sample bias, 




words in the forecast announcement or for which required data is not available on First Call Management 
Issued Guidance database (forecast characteristics and analyst forecasts), Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) (return and price data), and Compustat (accounting data).   
 To increase the internal validity of our design, we also discarded 2,035 forecasts bundled with 
earnings releases. Following the literature (e.g., Anilowski et al. 2007; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2012), we 
define bundled management forecasts as those falling within two days of an earnings announcement date.  
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) argue that the sign of the unexpected hard management forecast news is 
potentially measured incorrectly when accompanied by an earnings release (i.e., a bundled forecast) 
because the analyst expectation used to compute the unexpected management forecast news is out of date; 
that is, it has not been updated in light of the implications of the accompanying earnings release for 
analysts’ expectations of future earnings. Earnings announcements also contain a host of additional price-
relevant disclosures for which control is difficult. Furthermore, it is not clear to which of these additional 
disclosures the linguistic tone in the announcement pertains. Finally, we read the remaining management 
forecast disclosures and discarded 245 because they referred to the management forecasts of more than 
one firm or were ex post reports about the price reactions to the management forecasts. Our final sample 
consists of 1,764 management earnings forecasts issued by 750 distinct firms over our 10-year sample 
period. Typical of prior management forecast studies, our sample is highly diversified across firms and 
time. It contains annual and quarterly forecasts; so, if firms issued forecasts in each quarter and year, we 
would observe 37,500 forecasts (750 firms x 10 years x (4 quarters + 1 annual forecast per year). Less 
than 5 percent of those potential periods contain an unbundled management earnings forecast, with the 
large majority of firms in our sample issuing only one or two unbundled management forecasts during the 
sample period (i.e., 336 issued one forecast, and 223 issued two forecasts).  




We obtain our measure of linguistic tone using textual analysis of management earnings forecast 
disclosures.6 Prior evidence (Loughran and McDonald 2011; Demers and Vega 2014) suggests that 
generic linguistic algorithms such as Diction or General Inquirer may yield noisy measures of  “positive” 
and “negative” linguistic tone in the context of financially oriented text passages. Accordingly, we use the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) (L&M) finance-oriented dictionaries (i.e., word lists) for capturing 
“positivity” and “negativity” (measures that L&M refer to as Fin-Pos and Fin-Neg, respectively).7  
Following the financial linguistics literature (e.g., Davis et al. 2012; Demers and Vega 2014), our 
principal measure of tone is defined as the difference between positive (optimistic) and negative 
(pessimistic) words in the disclosure deflated by number of total words in the disclosure, which we label 
as NetPositivity.  
 Similar to most prior studies, our NetPositivity variable does not attempt to explicitly measure the 
“unexpected” portion of tone. Although some studies have examined the time-series properties of tone in 
earnings releases, leading them to adopt the change in net optimism as a proxy for the “unexpected” or 
“news” component of linguistic tone, we have opted not to do so for several reasons. First, as Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) point out, measuring “unexpected” tone in this way imposes a considerable amount 
of structure on the linguistic parameters; specifically, it presumes a considerable amount of processing 
capability on the part of investors in the cross-section. While this is conceivable in the context of 
                                                 
6 We follow the cleansing procedure proposed by Demers and Vega (2014). Corporate press releases on the 
newswire services often include several paragraphs at the end of the announcement that are not part of the body of 
the announcement that matters to our study. Specifically, the releases typically include a company-standard 
paragraph that describes the firm, often using very flattering language. In addition, most of the articles tend to 
include some form of safe-harbor disclaimer related to the forward-looking information included in the press 
release. These latter paragraphs vary somewhat across firms but are generally boilerplate and are presumed to be 
drafted by the company’s lawyers. Finally, the press releases typically end with company contact information such 
as a listing of the corporate website address, their investor relations contact names and numbers, information related 
to upcoming conference calls, or a combination of these. Since all of these paragraphs contain textual and numerical 
data that may include language relating to optimism, pessimism, and certainty that does not form part of the content 
portion of management’s press release per se, based upon manual review and the identification of keyword strings, 
we developed algorithms to cleanse the .txt files of such non-announcement content. These cleansed .txt files are 
used as the basis for the linguistic characteristics extracted from the firm’s earnings forecast press releases. 
7 Rogers et al. (2011) argue that more general language measures such as Diction might be more relevant in the 
context of communications with nonfinancial audiences such as attorneys, judges, and others. In untabulated 
analyses described later, we find that, in our sample, the Diction-based linguistic tone measure is not as price-




regularly recurring, mandated, quarterly earnings announcements, it is much less likely to hold in the 
context of sporadically issued, nonstandardized management forecasts. Second, Demers and Vega (2014) 
take this more refined approach (in the earnings release context) and report that their basic findings are 
unaffected by the use of net optimism rather than the change in net optimism. Finally, a sufficient time 
series of management forecasts is not available for the majority of our sample firms, precluding the 
modeling of the time-series behavior of tone in the context of management forecasts. The consequences 
of not specifying an expectations model for our tone variable would generally be to introduce noise into 
the measure, thereby reducing the power of our cross-sectional tests.8 As we discuss below, however, the 
results in relation to the NetPositivity variable are generally quite strong and significant.9 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the forecasts, linguistic tone, and other regression variables.10 In 
Panel A, consistent with prior research, the unbundled management forecasts in our sample are, on 
average, not good news, as evidenced by the negative means and medians for abnormal announcement 
returns (AR) and the near zero mean and median management forecast surprises (FSURP).11 Mean 
NetPositivity is similarly slightly negative, and the median is zero. Panel B shows that the majority of 
                                                 
8 Related to this point, introduction of an expectations model adds additional noise to the analysis if linguistic tone is 
a change rather than a levels variable. It is not clear that NetPositivity is a levels variable. For example, words like 
“better” and “improve” are positive words that indicate a change in prospects rather than a level. 
9 The text that we use is from the financial press or newswire coverage of a firm’s earnings guidance press 
release. The text passages largely reiterate the management’s filing. We recognize that management support 
personnel (e.g., investor relations and legal professionals) are likely to influence the filing. Therefore one can view 
the disclosure as generated by a management team. Regardless of whether the language is individual-generated or 
team-generated, it is still substantially less ex post verifiable. Furthermore, reporter or editor choices to paraphrase 
rather than directly quote might add noise and make it more difficult to reject the null hypotheses in H1b (the 
discretion-related hypothesis) in the direction we expect.   
10 The distributions presented in Table 1 are after winsorizing every continuous, naturally unbounded variable at 
both the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
11 AR is the size- and book-to-market-adjusted three-day announcement return centered on the announcement date 
t=0. FSURP is the management forecast surprise measured as the management forecast minus the preceding median 
consensus analyst forecast, all scaled by pre-announcement (t=−2) security price. To compute the management 
forecast for nonpoint forecasts, we use the midpoint of ranges and the disclosed upper or lower bound for maximum 




forecasts convey quantitative news that agrees in terms of sign with the sign of NetPositivity (66.4%), are 
not rounded (74.6%), occur after Regulation FD (61.3%), and occur before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(65.2%). Panel C shows that the forecasts are primarily range forecasts (70.2%). Panel D shows a high 
dispersion of forecasts across years, with an initial increase in forecast incidence over time followed by a 
decrease starting around the time of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in late 2000 and Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) in 2002.12  
4.2 Confirmation of prior findings in the management forecast setting 
The purpose of Table 3 is to confirm two findings in the prior literature for our sample of unbundled 
management forecasts:  1) linguistic tone is price relevant incremental to hard news (in our case, the 
quantitative management forecast) surprise, and 2) the signs of the hard news and the simultaneously 
released linguistic tone tend to agree. To confirm the pricing relation, we estimate the following pooled 
cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares model: 
 ARjt = β0 + β1 FSURPjt + β2 NetPositivityjt + β3 OtherFSURPjt + εjt,   (1)  
where j is a firm subscript, t represents a management forecast at date t, OtherFSURP is the value of 
FSURP for any other management forecast in the press release and set equal to zero if another forecast is 
not present, and all other variables are as previously defined. β2 > 0 provides confirmation of the findings 
of prior literature in our management earnings forecast sample.13 
 Two key research design issues are relevant to the estimation of equation (1). The first issue is the 
degree of observation independence. Our sample is highly diversified in event time and by firm. That is, 
typical of management forecast samples, there are very few firms releasing on any given date, suggesting 
                                                 
12 Kross, Ro, and Suk (2011) report means for the First Call population for 1996–2008. Based on their analysis, their 
(our) means on two key descriptors of the sample—log of firm size and log of one plus analyst following—are 6.70 
(7.22) and 2.40 (2.00), respectively. Thus our final sample is relatively similar to the First Call population of firms. 
13 Ng, Tuna, and Verdi (2011) document a delayed response to unexpected quantitative management forecast news.  
Although market efficiency is a maintained assumption in our analysis, given the post-announcement drift literature 




that mean cross-sectional correlation is very low, and, although a given firm might enter the sample more 
than once, the AR measurements are not consecutive.  As a result, there is no reason to believe that serial 
correlation in the dependent variable (and thus in the residuals) exists. For example, Bernard (1987) 
demonstrates very low serial correlation in consecutive AR (again, ours are not consecutive and thus the 
expected correlation would be even lower) and little effect on standard errors of ignoring serial 
correlation. However, there may be two management forecasts in a single announcement. When this 
occurs, AR is measured at the same date for both observations, and thus the two observations are not 
independent. Accordingly, we cluster these observations and control for year fixed effects so that all 
reported tests are based upon standard errors computed from independent observation clusters (see 
Petersen 2009).14 Our clustering approach yields 1,157 clusters (approximately 1.5 observations per 
cluster on average). 
 The second issue in estimating equation (1) is control for other information. Inclusion of 
OtherFSURP controls for the other earnings information in the press release. However, other non-
earnings information can exist in a management forecast announcement. We consider this issue in 
supplemental tests described later.   
 Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1). We present the results for regressions 
on hard forecast news (FSURP) and linguistic tone (NetPositivity) separately and then together to confirm 
the incremental information content of linguistic tone. The results support the incremental pricing of 
                                                 
14 As pointed out by Peterson (2009), the appropriate clustering procedure (or fixed effect modeling) in panel data 
depends on whether one has reason to believe that dependence exists in the residuals in the cross-section (date) and 
time-series (firm). Gow et al. (2010) make this point as well. In describing Peterson’s findings in two finance 
applications, asset pricing and capital structure, they state: “He concludes that in these settings ‘clustering standard 
errors by both firm and time appears unnecessary’ (Peterson 2009, 473). In contrast, we find that, in a variety of 
accounting applications, two-way cluster-robust standard errors are required for valid inferences. The difference 
between our findings and those of Peterson (2009) is due to the fact that accounting variables (e.g., earnings and 
credit ratings) exhibit greater dependence both over time and in cross-section than finance variables (e.g., returns).” 
We use returns in our tests. An alternative approach would be to discard one of the forecasts from the sample. But, 
because each forecast has its own properties of interest (e.g., sign, form, rounding, horizon), we do not follow this 
approach in our main tests. In an untabulated analysis, we discard one of the forecasts, repeat our tests, and obtain 
consistent results. Finally, although we believe that two-way clustering is not necessary, to ensure the robustness of 
our analysis, in untabulated tests, we use alternative clustering approaches including two-way clustering (described 




linguistic tone. The coefficients on FSURP and NetPositivity are both significantly positive in their 
individual regressions and when considered jointly.15 
The incremental economic effect of a change in NetPositivity on security prices is substantial. In 
the multiple regression, a one standard deviation increase in FSURP is associated with an increase in 
three-day size and book-to-market adjusted returns of 167 basis points, and a one standard deviation 
increase in NetPositivity is associated with an increase in adjusted returns of 336 basis points (results not 
tabulated). The relative economic importance of linguistic tone in our sample of management forecast 
press releases is initial evidence of a stronger role for language in purely voluntary disclosure settings.  
Demers and Vega (2011) report an increase in returns for a one standard deviation of linguistic tone of 72 
basis points in the earnings release setting.16  
Table 4, Panel A, presents a chi-square test of whether the signs of linguistic tone and the hard 
management forecast news tend to agree. The hard forecast news sign is good (bad) news when FSURP ≥ 
0 (< 0) and the linguistic tone proxy is good (bad) when NetPositivity ≥ 0 (< 0). Examination of the main 
diagonal reveals that 66.4% of the forecasts in our sample contain linguistic tone that is directionally 
consistent with the hard earnings forecast surprise. In other words, good news forecasts tend to be 
accompanied by net optimistic language, while bad news forecasts are predominantly accompanied by net 
pessimistic language. Chi-square tests reject the null of no association between the signs of forecast news 
                                                 
15 The coefficient estimate on OtherFSURP is not significant in the expected positive direction. OtherFSURP is 
insignificant because it is largely redundant when present and not always present. When considered in isolation in a 
simple regression, OtherFSURP has a t-statistic of 3.0. Also, our sample includes forecast releases occurring close 
to the period end, which some studies refer to as “warnings.” Our conclusions are not affected by discarding 
management forecasts issued less than 14 days before the earnings release date. As an alternative specification 
check, we modify equation (1) to include intercept and slope shifts for these warnings. The insignificant coefficients 
obtained on these variables indicate that the price reactions to quantitative forecast and linguistic tone do not differ 
for warnings. We also replicate our analysis using the alternative Diction linguistic tone proxy. Consistent with 
greater noise in this proxy, its t-statistic is much smaller in a simple regression. When both proxies enter the multiple 
regression, the Diction proxy is subsumed by the L&M proxy. That is, the L&M proxy is strongly significant and 
the Diction proxy is insignificant. This relative strength of the L&M proxy is consistent with prior research findings. 
16 If we rerun our analysis for management forecasts bundled with earnings releases to come closer to the Demers 
and Vega sample, we find an increase in returns for a one standard deviation of linguistic tone of 94 basis points for 
the L&M proxy and 48 basis points for the Diction proxy, an average of 71 basis points. The 72 basis point effect in 
Demers and Vega (2011) is obtained using a linguistic tone proxy that combines the L&M proxy, the Diction proxy, 




and linguistic tone. Although these findings are consistent with the results of prior linguistic studies that 
have documented a uniformly positive correlation between linguistic tone and unexpected earnings in 
earnings press releases, they contrast sharply with a general finding in prior research of strategic bundling 
of good news with bad news, presumably to reduce the price consequences of bad news (e.g.,Waymire 
1984; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2012). We note, however, that the sign association is not perfect; signs 
disagree in 33.6% of the cases, and the off-diagonals are roughly equally divided between positive and 
negative linguistic tone. Table 4, Panel B, documents significantly positive Pearson product-moment and 
Spearman rank-order correlations between the continuous FSURP and NetPositivity variables. 
4.3 Contemporaneous verification of linguistic tone 
 
To examine our main hypotheses related to the contemporaneous verification of linguistic tone, we 
estimate the following model:  
ARjt = γ0  
Baseline: + γ1 NetPositivityjt   
Agreement (H1a)/Management incentives (H1b): 
+ γ2 SignsAgreejt + γ3 SignsAgree+/+jt*NetPositivityjt + γ4 SignsAgree-/-jt*NetPositivityjt  
Hard news precision (H2): 
  + γ5 DWidthjt + γ6 DWidthjt*NetPositivityjt + γ7 Roundjt + γ8 Roundjt*NetPositivityjt  
Hyperbole (H3): 
+ γ9 |NetPositivityjt| + γ10 |NetPositivityjt|*NetPositivityjt   
Other:  + γ11 Litigationjt + γ12 Litigationjt*NetPositivityjt + γ13 ForecastReputationjt  
+ γ14 ForecastReputationjt*NetPositivityjt + γ15 Sizejt + γ16 Sizejt*NetPositivityjt  
+ γ17 Horizonjt + γ18 Horizonjt*NetPositivityjt  + γ19 AnalystFollowingjt  
+ γ20 AnalystFollowingjt*NetPositivityjt + γ21 Certaintyjt + γ22 Certaintyjt*NetPositivityjt 




Controls: + γ25 FSURPjt + γ26  OtherFSURPjt + γ27 DWidthjt*FSURPjt + γ28 Roundjt*FSURPjt  
+ γ29 Litigationjt*FSURPjt + γ30 ForecastReputationjt*FSURPjt + γ31 Sizejt*FSURPjt  
+ γ32 Horizonjt*FSURPjt  + γ33 AnalystFollowingjt*FSURPjt + γ34 PostFDjt*FSURPjt  
+ γ35 PostSOXjt*FSURPjt + γ36 |FSURPjt| + γ37 |FSURPjt|*FSURPjt  + εjt.  (2) 
4.3.1 Coefficient predictions based on H1–H3 
SignsAgree equals 1 if the signs of FSURP and NetPositivity agree and 0 otherwise. If management 
forecasts serve as contemporaneous verifiers of linguistic tone (H1a), then the coefficients on 
SignsAgree+/+*NetPositivity (good hard news verifies net positive tone) and 
SignsAgree−/−*NetPositivity (bad hard news verifies net negative tone) will be positive (γ3, γ4 > 0). If 
verification of net positive linguistic tone is more important to investors (H1b), then we expect the 
coefficient on SignsAgree+/+ to be greater than coefficient on SignsAgree−/− (γ3> γ4).   
The hard news precision hypothesis (H2) predicts attenuation of price reaction to linguistic tone 
when forecasts are imprecise and thus more difficult to verify. DWidth equals 1 when Width is greater 
than the sample median and 0 otherwise. Width is the high minus low endpoints of a management range 
forecast, divided by price. Point forecasts are set to Width = 0, and minimum and maximum forecasts are 
set to the highest value of Width in the sample. Round equals 1 if the management forecast is perfectly 
divisible by $0.05 and 0 otherwise. H2 predicts negative coefficients on the DWidth*NetPositivity and 
Round*NetPositivity interactions (γ6, γ8 < 0).  
If linguistic tone suffers credibility problems due to the hyperbole bias (H3), then the coefficient 
on the product of the absolute value of linguistic tone and linguistic tone, |NetPositivity|*NetPositivity, 
will be negative (γ10 < 0), which indicates that the mapping of linguistic tone into returns is weaker for 
extreme tone.  




The model also includes other potential cross-sectional differences in the pricing of linguistic 
tone. Some of these effects have been examined in prior studies of the pricing of language but not in the 
context of a voluntary management forecast setting. Others have not been examined with respect to the 
pricing of language but have been found to be cross-sectional determinants of the pricing of earnings. To 
the extent that language predicts earnings, they are potential cross-sectional determinants of the pricing of 
language as well. At a minimum, these effects can be viewed as controls in the testing of our main 
hypotheses. To the extent that the effects have been found to exist for language in other contexts, our 
results provide evidence of the generalizability of the effect to the voluntary management forecast setting.  
To the extent that the effects have been documented for earnings but not for language, our results provide 
an incremental understanding of the pricing of language in the cross-section beyond our main hypotheses. 
Litigation equals the probability of litigation estimated as the fitted value in the model provided 
by Rogers and Stocken (2005). Although managers have incentives to increase stock prices with 
optimistic disclosures, fear of litigation based on voluntary disclosures that are ex post over-optimistic 
tempers the tendency towards over-optimism in voluntary disclosures (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 
1995; Baginski et al. 2002; Rogers and Stocken 2005). Rogers et al. (2011) document that managers’ use 
of optimistic language increases litigation risk by showing that plaintiffs target optimistic statements in 
their lawsuits and that, controlling for a firm’s economic conditions, sued firms have unusually 
linguistically optimistic earnings announcements. Accordingly, we expect investors will expect managers 
to avoid increased legal costs by tempering their optimism. The discipline provided by legal liability and 
the cost associated with legal exposure create more credible language, resulting in a greater price response 
to linguistic tone, suggesting that the coefficient on the Litigation*NetPositivity will be positive (γ12 > 0). 
ForecastReputation equals the log of the count of the total number of management forecasts 




those forecasts computed as in Williams (1996).17 Average forecast usefulness is zero if the firm did not 
issue a management forecast in the five prior years. Thus the proxy is increasing in the historical ability of 
managers to bring analysts closer to actual earnings and the length of the forecasting history available for 
investors to assess that ability. If investors believe that management forecast reputation is generalizable to 
other types of signals, then the coefficient on ForecastReputation*NetPositivity will be positive (γ14 > 0). 
Prior literature documents an effect of the information environment on price reactions to 
disclosures in general. In a rich pre-disclosure information environment, information is impounded into 
price before news events. Using the typical proxy for richness of the pre-disclosure information 
environment, firm size, Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987) empirically document a smaller price reaction 
to earnings news for larger firms. Size is the log of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the forecast 
year. We predict a similarly attenuated response to the language accompanying the managerial forecasts 
of large firms (γ16 < 0). 
  Timing is a unique characteristic of the management forecast setting that also affects the richness 
of the information environment. Management forecasts are issued over different horizons. All else held 
equal, longer horizons are characterized by less competing information. As a result, earlier voluntary 
disclosures are likely to be a more important source of information for the resolution of uncertainty about 
the firm’s future performance. Horizon equals the number of calendar days between the management 
forecast and the subsequent earnings release. We therefore expect that linguistic tone issued with longer 
horizon forecasts will be more informative in price setting (γ18 > 0). 
Finally, Demers and Vega (2014) find that linguistic uncertainty and analyst following modify the 
pricing of linguistic tone in earnings releases. Certainty is a measure of linguistic certainty derived from 
the language in the management forecast press release using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
                                                 
17 Williams (1996) defines usefulness as the absolute leading consensus analyst error minus the absolute 
management forecast error deflated by price. Positive values indicate that the analyst would become more accurate 
by simply parroting the management forecast. Combining usefulness and frequency is motivated by the empirical 




approach (multiplied by −100). AnalystFollowing is the log of the number of analysts providing forecasts 
at the management earnings forecast date.  
4.3.3 Other control variables 
 We also include interactions of NetPositivity with two indicator variables to control for regulatory 
change. PostFD equals 1 for each management forecast observation issue after passage of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure and 0 otherwise. PostSOX equals 1 for each management forecast observation issue after 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for the other information in the release 
(e.g., FSURP, OtherFSURP), and we interact FSURP with a set of modifiers identified in prior literature 
(e.g. forecast form, rounding, firm size, etc.), including its own absolute value to capture the S-curve 
effect in Freeman and Tse (1989).  
4.4 Main results 
Table 5 presents Pearson product-moment correlations among the variables used in the various 
regressions reported in this section. Although most of the correlations do not significantly differ from 
zero, some correlations are significant. Accordingly, we examine multi-collinearity diagnostics when 
estimating all regressions.  
We first present tests of the individual effects of each hypothesized contemporaneous verifier in 
Table 6. Each column estimates an extended version of equation (1) that excludes control variables (other 
than FSURP and OtherFSURP, which appear in equation 1) and includes only one contemporaneous 
verifier. For obvious reasons, we do not base our final conclusions on the Table 6 results. However, we 
feel that it is useful to see the simple “univariate” effects of each variable on the pricing of language. For 
econometric reasons, we include intercept shifts on the effects of interest, but the verification effects are 
measured by the slope shift coefficients (i.e., the interactions) in each regression. 
The results are consistent with our hypotheses. The first column shows that the effect of language 




with the sign of the linguistic tone, regardless of whether the confirmed tone is positive or negative (H1a). 
Of particular interest is the coefficient estimate for NetPositivity in the first column. This coefficient 
captures the pricing of linguistic tone when its sign does not agree with the sign of FSURP. The 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The effect is stronger for agreement of two positive 
signs than for agreement of two negative signs, as indicated by the significant F-test on the equality of the 
two slope-shift coefficients (H1b).18 The results in the second and third columns are consistent with the 
notion that the pricing of language accompanying less precise (and thus more difficult to verify) 
quantitative forecasts is attenuated (H2). The fourth column shows that extreme linguistic tone is also 
discounted (H3).19    
Table 7 presents the results of the full model with all controls. Confirming our earlier findings, 
we find significant positive coefficients on the FSURP control variable and NetPositivity. Turning 
attention to the coefficients of interest on the slope shifts, all of our hypotheses are supported by the data. 
Significant positive (negative) slope shift coefficients indicate a stronger (weaker) pricing of linguistic 
tone. As predicted by H1a, the management forecast serves as a contemporaneous verifier of linguistic 
tone. The coefficients on the interactions between sign agreement and linguistic tone 
(SignsAgree+/+*NetPositivity and SignsAgree−/−*NetPositivity) are both significantly positive, 
consistent with the prediction that the agreement of the signs of the quantitative hard management 
forecast news and linguistic tone strengthen the price reaction to linguistic tone. The slope shift 
coefficient involving SignsAgree+/+ (positive tone confirmed by hard news) is more than four times 
                                                 
18 An alternative approach is simply to interact NetPositivity and FSURP. This interaction also captures the idea that 
the price reaction to NetPositivity depends on FSURP. However, it differs from our measure on two dimensions. 
First, it does not partition on sign. If the two variables are not symmetrically distributed around zero, then the 
interaction might indicate that, for example, small negative FSURP confirms small positive NetPositivity or small 
positive FSURP confirms small negative NetPositivity. H1 is about tone (positive versus negative), and thus we do 
not expect conflicting signs to increase stock price reaction to language. Second, the interaction would capture 
extreme magnitudes, which would confound it with our test of the hyperbole hypothesis (H3). In an untabulated 
analysis, we replaced the sign interactions with this sign and magnitude interaction. It is significant (t = 3.06), 
indicating that the price reaction to language depends on the level of the hard forecast news. We note, however, that 
this alternative untabulated regression has an R2 of 15.1%, compared to 17.6% for the sign agreement only 
specification in Table 6. 
19 The size of the coefficient on the interaction of extreme linguistic tone with linguistic tone is driven simply by the 




larger than the slope shift coefficient involving SignsAgree−/− (negative tone confirmed by hard news) 
and statistically significant based on the F-test of the difference between the coefficients reported at the 
bottom of the table. This finding is consistent with the prediction that management incentive-induced 
language inflation results in a stronger confirming effect of hard forecast news on positive linguistic tone 
(H1b).20  
As predicted by H2, the coefficients on DWidth*NetPositivity and Round*NetPositivity are both 
significantly negative. The deterioration of quantitative forecast news precision, evidenced by wider 
forecast ranges and rounding, attenuates the pricing of linguistic tone. As predicted by H3, the coefficient 
on |NetPositivity|*NetPositivity is significantly negative, an indication that language hyperbole is 
discounted.  
Aside from the results on our main hypotheses, we detect that litigation risk results in more 
credible linguistic tone with stronger associated price impacts, as evidenced by the weakly significant 
positive coefficient on Litigation*NetPositivity.21 As documented by Demers and Vega (2014) in the 
earnings release setting, the information environment has a significant effect on the pricing of linguistic 
tone. The rich pre-disclosure information environment proxied by firm size attenuates the price response 
to linguistic tone, as evidenced by the significant negative coefficient on Size*NetPositivity. The existence 
of information intermediaries who produce competing information and demand high quality management 
disclosure strengthens the price response to linguistic tone, as evidenced by the significantly positive 
coefficient on AnalystFollowing*NetPositivity.22   
                                                 
20 We re-estimated the model with alternative clustering approaches including by firm, by date, two-way clustering 
by firm and date, and two-way clustering by firm and quarter. All of our conclusions are unaffected except for one. 
In some of the alternative clustering approaches, the marginally significant coefficient on 
SignsAgree−/−*NetPositivity becomes marginally insignificant. However, as H1b hypothesizes, we expect the 
weakest result on this variable. Also, because we predict that the more precise signal (the management earnings 
forecast) verifies the less precise signal (language), and not the reverse, we do not have interactions of the sign 
agreement variables with FSURP in our model. If we include them, consistent with our expectations, they are 
insignificant, and our other results are not affected. 
21 A concurrent working paper by Bonsall et al. (2012) finds a similar result for the litigation effect in earnings 
releases. 
22 We do not find an effect for the Certainty modifier in contrast to Demers and Vega (2014). The nonsignificance 




In summary, our results from univariate and multiple regression tests confirm our predictions that 
characteristics of the quantitative management forecast news and language obtained from the 
management forecast announcement explain the price reaction to language.23  
5 Additional tests 
5.1 Post-announcement drift 
Market efficiency is a maintained assumption in our analysis. However, in a descriptive vein, we replicate 
the Table 3 analysis to examine whether the incremental pricing of linguistic tone is delayed by replacing 
the dependent variable AR with AR60, an analogous 60-day post-announcement drift return accumulated 
beginning with the second day after the forecast release. We estimate three versions of the analogous 
pooled cross-sectional, time series, ordinary least squares model (with clustering and year effects as 
before): 
 AR60jt = λ0 + λ1 FSURPjt + λ2 NetPositivityjt + λ3 OtherFSURPjt + εjt   (3)  
 AR60jt = λ0a + λ1a FSURPjt + λ2a NetPositivityjt + λ3a OtherFSURPjt  
+ λ4a Vfactorjt + λ5a Vfactorjt*NetPositivityjt + εjt     (3a)  
 AR60jt = λ0b + λ1b FSURPjt + λ2b NetPositivityjt + λ3b OtherFSURPjt    
  + λ4b SignsAgreejt + λ5b SignsAgreejt*NetPositivityjt + εjt,     (3b)  
where Vfactor equals the sum of four dichotomous verification proxies used to test our three hypotheses: 
SignsAgree (which equals one when the hard news verifies the sign of the language), minus a 
                                                                                                                                                             
forecast press release setting, the management forecast provides a contemporaneous verifier of linguistic tone, and 
the forecast has its own unique properties: width, rounding, forecast reputation, horizon, etc. In this setting, it 
appears that these unique properties dominate. 
23 In additional tests on reduced samples, we added additional controls for distress and industry concentration. The 
controls were intercept shifts and slope shift interactions of the variables with NetPositivity. These additional effects 
were insignificant and our main results were unaffected. We also redefined the announcement as the unit of analysis 
rather than the management forecast by discarding the annual forecast in announcements with both quarterly and 
annual forecasts (while still controlling for the information in the annual forecast through OtherFSURP). Our results 
on the variables of interest were not affected. Finally, we controlled for the data source of the announcement (i.e., 
Dow Jones Newswire versus PR Newswire) with additional intercept and slope shift coefficients with no effect on 




dichotomous variable equal to one if |NetPositivity| is above its sample median and zero otherwise (which 
measures the lower verifiability due to the hyperbole effect) minus Dwidth (which equals one when the 
hard forecast is less precise and thus less useful in verification) minus Rounded (which equals one when 
the hard forecast is less precise and thus less useful in verification).24  
 Coefficients λ2, λ2a, and λ2b < 0 capture whether a pricing reversal occurs in the post-announcement 
period for NetPositivity. Equation (3) estimates whether the reversal exists. Equation (3a) estimates 
whether a reversal exists for conditions where the initial announcement period pricing was greatest (i.e., 
Vfactor is larger). Equation (3b) estimates whether a reversal exists for a single condition for which the 
announcement period pricing was greatest (i.e. when the signs of hard news and linguistic tone agree). 
Examining the sign agreement condition in isolation is motivated by the results in Table 6. Recall that 
NetPositivity was incrementally insignificant in the announcement period when signs did not agree.  
 Table 8 reports the estimation results. The first column shows the unconditional regression (equation 
3). The coefficient on NetPositivity is not significantly less than zero, indicating that the pricing effects in 
the announcement period do not reverse in the 60-day post-announcement period. In fact, like Demers 
and Vega (2014), we detect a directionally consistent and statistically significant price drift associated 
with linguistic tone. The results persist when we condition on Vfactor (second column) and when we 
condition on SignAgreement (third column). Consistent with our results in Table 6 for announcement 
period returns, the association of linguistic tone with post-announcement returns also exists only for the 
case in which the sign of the hard news and linguistic tone agree.25 
                                                 
24 For example, the highest value of Vfactor equals 1 when conditions exist that maximize contemporaneous 
verification. This occurs when signs of the hard forecast and linguistic tone agree, the forecast is not rounded, the 
forecast range is smaller, and the linguistic tone is not extreme. 
25 The coefficient on NetPositivity is negative but insignificant. Huang et al. (2014) document a price reversal on a 
proxy for abnormal tone in the context of earnings releases (i.e., a significant negative coefficient). To investigate 
whether our “unverified” tone would yield similar results as their abnormal tone measure, we repeated our 
estimation of equation (3ʹʹ) on a smaller sample for which we could obtain data on a majority of control variables 
they use in their study (i.e., size, book-to-market, earnings volatility, return volatility, return level, and accruals).  
Our coefficient on NetPositivity did not achieve significance in the negative direction in this alternative estimation 





Baginski et al. (2004) show that external attributions are associated with an increase in the 
association of unexpected earnings conveyed by a quantitative management forecast and stock returns.  
Therefore external attributions are a potential correlated omitted variable in our study if they are 
positively associated with any of our slope shift variables for which we expect a positive slope shift or 
negatively associated with any of our slope shift variables for which we expect a negative slope shift. For 
example, we hypothesize in H1 that hard news and linguistic tone sign agreement increases the strength 
of the relationship between net optimism and share price, a positive slope shift. Therefore, if the existence 
of an external attribution is positively correlated with sign agreement, the potential correlated omitted 
variable problem can exist. If external attributions are not correlated or negatively correlated with sign 
agreement, then omitting an external attribution by net optimism interaction in our model does not bias 
the coefficient on our hypothesized sign agreement by net optimism interaction.26 As another example, 
we hypothesize in H2 and H3 that larger absolute values of net optimism, rounding, and range width 
decrease the strength of the relationship between net optimism and share price, a negative slope 
shift. Therefore, if external attributions are negatively correlated with absolute net optimism, rounding, or 
range width, the potential correlated omitted variable problem exists. External attributions that are not 
correlated or positively correlated with these variables do not cause a coefficient bias problem.  
From our original sample (i.e., the sample before we read the text to identify missed bundling and 
other potential issues), we selected and read 244 documents to identify external attributions.27 Using the 
classification method proposed by Baginski et al. (2004), we identified 244 external attributions (an 
average of 1 per document). We estimated a logistic regression model with a dichotomous dependent 
                                                                                                                                                             
information while they measure abnormal tone using an expected tone model. Furthermore, they investigate the drift 
after earnings releases and our sample excludes earnings releases. 
26 Our predictions are directional. The bias we refer to is a bias that would lead to an incorrect inference. In this 
example, a negative correlation is a bias in favor of a null hypothesis that we reject. That is, a negative correlation 
would work against our prediction and thus is a concern only if we were unable to reject the null. 
27 We randomly chose our sample from a set of observations that had not been subject to our data requirements and 




variable for external attributions (equal to one if present and zero otherwise; results not tabulated). The 
full set of main effects for hypothesized variables and controls (i.e., sign agreement, width, rounding, 
absolute net optimism, hard forecast surprise, and so on) were included as independent variables to 
explain external attributions, consistent with the exploratory approach in Baginski et al. (2004).  
Absolute net optimism is significantly positively associated with the existence of an external 
attribution, which is not an issue because absolute net optimism is hypothesized in H3 to decrease the 
relation between language and stock prices. The fact that external attributions are positively associated 
with absolute net optimism works against our prediction. Forecast reputation and litigation risk are both 
negatively associated with external attributions, again not an issue because these variables are predicted to 
increase the relation between language and stock prices (and they are control rather than test variables in 
our main regressions).   
Although this is a small sample, we re-estimated the results in Table 3. Then, we re-estimated 
again adding intercept and slope shifts for external attributions (i.e., external attribution dummy variable 
and an external attribution by net positivity interaction). The intercept and slope coefficients for external 
attributions are insignificant and the coefficient on net positivity remains significantly positive.   
5.3 Other price-relevant content in the announcement 
We exclude announcements containing earnings releases, and we rule out external attributions as 
correlated, omitted variables. In addition to earnings releases and external attributions, management 
forecasts can contain other content that could represent correlated, omitted variables. We performed two 
additional tests to rule out the effects of the other information. First, using the random sample described 
in Section 5.2, we read each article to directly identify other content. Only 65 of the 300 announcements 
(21.7%) contain additional content. The two most frequently occurring other items are sales reports (21) 
and restructuring or job cut announcements (12). We also identified instances of external financing-




restatements (four), executive-related news such as new CEOs or CEO illness (four), litigation news such 
as the settlement of a legal case or expected litigation costs (three), production news such as opening a 
new plant or a new product approval (two), a strategic plan disclosure (two), and finally, a major 
customer that cut an order quantity (one). Using the same logistic regression methodology described in 
Section 5.2 with a dichotomous dependent variable for the existence of this other content, we found no 
evidence of an association between our main effects and the existence of the other content (results not 
tabulated). Using the same Table 3 re-estimation procedure described in Section 5.2, appending an 
intercept shift for the existence of special items and an interaction between special items and net positivity 
did not change our conclusions (results not tabulated). 
We also perform an indirect test using customized tone measures. We generate our own 
dictionaries based on the word lists from the L&M dictionary and check to see whether our tone measure 
is mainly affected by the type of words used in the announcement: content-based words or framing-based 
words. It is difficult to argue that a particular word is content or framing based. However, nouns are more 
likely to be associated with a real economic event. A noun is self-explainable; for example, the L&M 
dictionary includes (among many) the following negative nouns beginning with the letters A and B: 
ABANDONMENT, ABUSE, ACCIDENT, ACCUSATION, ACQUITTAL, ADVERSARY, 
ALLEGATION, ALLEGATIONS, ARREARS, ASSAULT, ATTRITION, BAILOUT, BANKRUPTCY, 
BREACH, BREAKDOWN, and BRIBE, and positive nouns: ABUNDANCE, ACCOMPLISHMENT, 
ACHIEVEMENT, ADVANCEMENT, ADVANTAGE, ALLIANCE, ATTAINMENT, 
ATTRACTIVENESS, BENEFIT, BOOM, and BREAKTHROUGH.28 
On the other hand, if the word is a verb, adjective, or adverb, it may be more likely to give action 
to, modify, or frame an event. That is, the word has less economic content in and of itself. Examples of 
negative words classified as verbs, adverbs, or adjectives include ABANDON, ABERRANT, 
ABNORMAL, ABOLISH, ABRUPT, ABUSE, ACCIDENTAL, ACCUSE, ADVERSARIAL, 
                                                 
28 We reclassified all 2,349 negative words and 354 positive words from the L&M dictionary as a noun, verb, 




ADVERSE, AGAINST, ALLEGED, ARGUE, BARRED, and BREAK, and positive words: ABLE, 
ABUNDANT, ACCLAIMED, ACCOMPLISH, ADEQUATELY, ASSURE, ATTRACTIVE, 
BEAUTIFUL, BENEFICIAL, BETTER, BOOMING, and BRILLIANT. 
We twice re-estimated our main model in Table 7, using a net optimism measure relying only on 
verbs, adverbs, and adjectives, once without control and once with control for a net optimism measure 
relying only on nouns. Our results on the hypothesized variables do not change in either specification 
(results not tabulated).  Interestingly, the coefficient on the net optimism measure relying only on nouns is 
less significant that the measure relying on verbs, adverbs, and adjectives (although still significantly 
positive, t = 2.66). Although our dictionary reclassification method is indirect and not a perfect control for 
other economic content, combined with the direct analysis of other information in this section and with 
the knowledge that we discard observations bundled with earnings announcements leads us to conclude 
that other information in the management forecast announcement is not driving our results on the 
hypothesized variables. 
5.4 Larger sample including bundled forecasts 
 As a final test to examine generalizability, we reintroduce bundled forecasts into the sample and 
control for the unexpected actual earnings. This increases our sample to 3,539 forecasts. The results for 
the test variables of interest are once again consistent with our main findings (results not tabulated). 
6 Conclusion 
Linguistic tone is relatively costless to provide and difficult to verify. In spite of these cheap talk 
characteristics, tone is incrementally priced to accompanying hard earnings news that is more easily 
verified. Using unbundled management earnings forecasts, we document a mechanism that serves as a 
timely alternative to ex post verification by which investors appear to assess the credibility of tone. We 
empirically link variation in the characteristics of quantitative disclosures that accompany language and a 




the signs of the quantitative management forecast and linguistic tone agree, tone’s incremental pricing is 
strengthened. The effect is stronger when a good-news quantitative forecast confirms positive linguistic 
tone, consistent with the notion that optimistic language is less credible than pessimistic language due to 
management incentives to increase stock prices. Lower quantitative forecast quality and a characteristic of 
the tone itself, management’s use of hyperbole for emphasis, attenuate the pricing of linguistic tone.  
Language appears to be a powerful contributor to the pricing of disclosures in which it appears. 
Our findings increase the understanding of the pricing of language by identifying unique conditions that 
explain cross-sectional variation in that pricing. The majority of prior research has concentrated on the 
pricing of language in several different disclosure contexts, but very little research has considered the 
determinants of variation in the pricing of language, either in the cross-section or over time.  
An interesting question is raised by the fact that we find linguistic tone to be incrementally priced 
in a sample of explicit forecasts of future earnings by management. The primary underlying economic 
reason to expect linguistic tone to be informative for prices is its predictive power for future earnings. 
Why then does language remain statistically and economically significant when it accompanies 
management-issued quantitative earnings forecasts? Managers may strategically use quantitative forecasts 
and linguistic tone to convey their expectations. If so, then some of the interesting work on the efficiency 
of management forecasts can be extended by considering language’s incremental role in conveying 
expectations. For example, prior research has tested the efficiency of management forecasting by 
calculating the association of public information such as past accruals (Gong et al. 2000; Xu 2010) and 
past management forecast errors (Xu 2009) with subsequent management forecast accuracy. Future 
research might explicitly model the role of linguistic tone in communicating earnings expectations and 
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Table 1 Sample selection  
 
Initial sample of management earnings forecasts from Dow Jones Business News and Press 
Releases Newswire (1997–2006) 6,180 
Lacking required First Call coverage or other required data (2,136) 
Bundled with earnings releasesa (2,035) 
Article contains multiple firms or discussion of price reactionsb    (245) 
Final sample of unbundled management earnings forecasts 1,764 
  
Distinct firms   750 
 
aWe read the text of forecasts initially identified as unbundled to verify that we have removed any forecasts bundled 
with earnings releases. The discarded forecast observations include those identified by our reading of the text. 
 




Table 2  Descriptive statistics for 1,754 management earnings forecasts  
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
Panel A: Variable distributions for continuous variables 
AR -0.053 0.128 -0.106 -0.028 0.023 
NetPositivity  -0.003 0.011 -0.010 -0.002 0.004 
FSURP -0.002 0.033 -0.005 -0.000 0.003 
Size 7.225 1.750 6.009 7.027 8.347 
ForecastReputation -0.003 0.019 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Horizon 121.4 138.9 25.0 49.0 183 
Width 0.021 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Certainty 18.30 14.56 9.12 14.15 22.00 
Litigation 0.218 0.337 0.004 0.031 0.289 
AnalystFollowing 2.002 0.795 1.609 2.079 2.564 
 
Panel B: Variable distributions for dichotomous categorical variables 
Variable Yes = 1 (%) No = 0 (%) 
SignsAgree 1,165 (66.4%) 589 (33.6%) 
Round 446 (25.4%) 1,308 (74.6%) 
PostFD 1,076 (61.3%) 678 (38.7%) 
PostSOX 610 (34.8%) 1,144 (65.2%) 
 
Panel C: Form distribution 
Variable Number of observations (%) 
Point 356 (20.3%) 
Range 1,232 (70.2%) 
Minimum 94 (5.4%) 
Maximum 72 (4.1%) 
 
Panel D: Year Distribution 
Year Number of observations (%) 
1997 97 (5.5%) 
1998 196 (11.2%) 
1999 220 (12.5%) 
2000 253 (14.4%) 
2001 282 (16.1%) 
2002 229 (13.1%) 
2003 163 (9.3%) 
2004 116 (6.6%) 
2005 112 (6.4%) 
2006 86 (4.9%) 
 
AR is the size and book-to-market adjusted three-day announcement period return. NetPositivity is the language 
metric derived from the management forecast as described in the text using the Loughran and McDonald (2010; 
L&M) financial dictionaries. FSURP is the management forecast surprise measured as the point (or midpoint of the 
range or disclosed minimum or maximum) forecast minus the preceding median consensus analyst forecast, scaled 







Table 2 continued 
 
ForecastReputation equals the log of the count of the total number of management forecasts issued over the prior 
five years (maximum of one per period) times the average management forecast usefulness computed as in Williams 
(1996). It is equal to zero if the firm did not issue a management forecast in the five prior years. Horizon equals the 
number of calendar days between the management forecast and subsequent earnings release. Width equals the high 
minus low endpoints of the management range forecast, divided by price. (Point forecasts are set to Width = 0; 
minimum and maximum forecasts are set to the highest value of Width in the sample.) Certainty is a measure of 
linguistic certainty derived from the language in the management forecast press release using the L&M dictionaries. 
Litigation equals probability of litigation estimated as the fitted value in the model proposed by Rogers and Stocken 
(2005). AnalystFollowing is the log of the number of analysts providing forecasts at the management earnings 
forecast date. SignsAgree equals 1 if the signs of FSURP and NetPositivity agree and 0 otherwise. Round equals 1 if 
the management forecast is perfectly divisible by $0.05 and 0 otherwise. PostFD equals 1 for each management 
forecast observation issue after passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure and 0 otherwise. PostSOX equals 1 for each 







Table 3  Is the linguistic tone in management forecasts incrementally priced? (AR is the dependent variable.) 
 
Variable Coefficient   (t-statistic) 
Coefficient   
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient   
(t-statistic) 





FSURP 0.578 (3.88)***  
0.506 
(3.36)*** 





OtherFSURP    
-0.092 
(-1.72) 
    
N 1,754 1,754 1,754 
R2  7.6% 13.2% 14.5% 
Firm/Date Clustered, Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
***/**/* indicate significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels in a one-tailed test (two-tailed for intercept). 
 
Good (bad) news is defined as FSURP ≥ 0 (FSURP < 0), where FSURP is the management earnings forecast 
surprise as defined in Table 1. 
 
Positive (Negative) tone is defined as NetPositivity ≥ 0 (NetPositivity < 0), where NetPositivity is the linguistic tone 




Table 4 Are hard management forecast news and linguistic tone associated? 
  
Panel A: Sign agreement 
 Sign of Linguistic Tone 
 Positive (%) Negative (%) 
Hard Forecast News:   
Good News (%) 642  (36.6%) 
308  
(17.6%) 
Bad News (%) 281 (16.0%) 
523  
(29.8%) 
χ2 test of independence = 185.9***  
 
 
Panel B: Correlation            
Pearson product moment correlation between FSURP and NetPositivity 0.175 *** 
  
Spearman rank order correlation between FSURP and NetPositivity 0.337 *** 
 
Good (bad) news is defined as FSURP ≥ 0 (FSURP < 0), where FSURP is the management earnings forecast 
surprise as defined in Table 1. 
 
Positive (Negative) tone is defined as NetPositivity ≥ 0 (NetPositivity < 0), where NetPositivity is the linguistic tone 
as defined in Table 1.   
 




Table 5  C
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Table 6  Univariate tests of the market verification of linguistic tone in management earnings forecasts for 
individual concurrent verifiers 
 































      
Agreement hypothesis (H1a):      
SignsAgree None 0.019 (2.03)**  
  
SignsAgree+/+* NetPositivity  + 5.604 (5.52)***  
  
SignsAgree-/-* NetPositivity   + 3.438 (3.77)***  
  
Management incentives hypothesis 
(H1b): 
F-statistic on difference between slope 
coefficients  
 4.75**  
  
      
Hard news precision hypothesis (H2):      
DWidth None  -0.009 (-1.44) 
  
DWidth* NetPositivity -  -1.113 (-1.82)** 
  
Round None   -0.003 (-0.46) 
 
Round* NetPositivity -   -1.458 (-2.00)** 
 
      
Hyperbole hypothesis (H3):      
|NetPositivity| None    -0.323 (-0.50) 
|NetPositivity|*NetPositivity -    -217.48 (-4.64)*** 
      
R2  17.6% 14.8% 14.8% 16.7% 
N  1,754 1,754 1,754 1,754 
 ***/**/* indicate significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels in a two-tailed test (one-tailed for specific sign 




Table 7  Market verification of linguistic tone in management earnings forecasts (multiple regression analysis) 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept None -0.045 -1.97** 
NetPositivity + 7.719 4.09*** 
SignsAgree None 0.009 0.87 
SignsAgree+/+* NetPositivity (H1a) + 6.533 4.48*** 
SignsAgree-/-* NetPositivity  (H1a) + 1.414 1.29* 
DWidth None 0.001 0.23 
DWidth* NetPositivity (H2) - -1.359 -2.36*** 
Round None 0.003 0.44 
Round* NetPositivity (H2) - -1.391 -2.36*** 
|NetPositivity| None -2.604 -2.58** 
|NetPositivity|*NetPositivity (H3) - -229.764 -4.94*** 
Additional potential cross-sectional determinants:    
Litigation None -0.013 -1.06 
Litigation* NetPositivity  + 1.867 1.57* 
ForecastReputation None 0.211 1.24 
ForecastReputation* NetPositivity  + 16.925 1.10 
Size None 0.003 1.28 
Size* NetPositivity - -0.670 -3.23*** 
Horizon None -0.000 -1.47 
Horizon* NetPositivity + 0.002 0.95 
AnalystFollowing None 0.001 0.34 
AnalystFollowing*NetPositivity + 0.891 2.09** 
Certainty None -0.001 -2.56** 
Certainty*NetPositivity + 0.008 0.23 
PostFD*NetPositivity None 0.359 0.38 
PostSOX*NetPositivity None 0.014 0.01 
Additional Controls:    
FSURP + 3.315 4.70*** 
OtherFSURP + 0.068 1.10 
DWidth* FSURP - -0.323 -1.67** 
Round* FSURP - -0.429 -1.97** 
Litigation* FSURP + 0.070 0.21 
ForecastReputation*FSURP + -1.920 -0.70 
Size*FSURP - -0.322 -3.65*** 
Horizon*FSURP + 0.001 1.37* 
AnalystFollowing*FSURP + 0.267 1.44* 
PostFD*FSURP None 0.014 0.05 
PostSOX*FSURP None 0.413 1.35 
|FSURP| None -0.187 -0.78 
|FSURP|*FSURP - -8.319 -3.54*** 
R2  27.1%  
N  1,754  
H1b: F-stat on difference between H1a coefficients  8.18***   
 ***/**/* indicate significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels in a two-tailed test (one-tailed for specific sign 




Table 8  Post-management forecast drift (AR60 is the dependent variable.) 
 
Variable Coefficient   (t-statistic) 
Coefficient   
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient   
(t-statistic) 




















Vfactor   
-0.002 
(-0.47)  
Vfactor*NetPositivity   
0.589 
(1.39)  
SignsAgree    
0.012 
(1.10) 
SignsAgree*NetPositivity    
2.647 
(2.55)** 
N 1,754 1,754 1,754 
R2  2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 
Firm/Date Clustered, 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
***/**/* indicate significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels in a two-tailed test. 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
AR60 is the size and book-to-market adjusted 60-day post-announcement period return. 
 
Vfactor equals the sum of four dichotomous verification proxies: SignsAgree (which equals 1 when the hard news 
verifies the sign of the language), minus a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if |NetPositivity| is above its sample 
median and 0 otherwise (which measures the lower verifiability due to the hyperbole effect) minus Dwidth (which 
equals 1 when the hard forecast is less precise and thus less useful in verification) minus Rounded (which equals 1 
when the hard forecast is less precise and thus less useful in verification). 
